Quality is currently a buzzword in all sectors of society, the quality of processes and products are measured and evaluated in different phases at different levels. Despite this preoccupation, the concept of quality remains elusive. No clear and unified definition exists; rather different stakeholders employ different definitions, and this is perceived as a problem. In our paper we shall discuss the concept of quality as it appears in higher education literature. What sense can we make of multifaceted and vague concepts that are used in many different ways? We shall address this problem from a philosophical perspective. First we shall use definition theory to draw a conceptual landscape that will yield an understanding of why quality is such an elusive concept. To address the problem of a common core (or lack thereof) of various meanings of a concept, we shall employ Wittgenstein and his idea of family resemblance.

But what is quality? If we unpack this concept, what do we find? In education, quality is but one of an array of large, fuzzy, vague concepts which are endowed with different meanings relative to context, perspective and speaker. Other examples are Bildung, knowledge, learning, theory, practice. How, then, do we treat such unwieldy concepts and make sure we speak about the same phenomenon? In our paper we shall discuss this problem from a philosophical viewpoint, namely by using definition theory. But first some background.

Mari Elken (2007) recently published her extended literature review of quality in higher education. She concludes that the picture of the different methods and practices employed in quality processes colorful and multifaceted, and that there are difficulties in finding clear definitions. “Discussions around what constitutes quality in higher education continue to be the focus of introductory comments in the literature”, she states (p. 185). “No clear definitions exist”, and it is experienced as a problem that different definitions exist for different stakeholders (op.cit.). Despite the lack of a unified concept of quality, different forms of evaluation are conducted systematically to ensure that an institution’s education holds “high level of quality”. Furthermore, according to Elken, the research literature on quality assurance systems gives no empirical evidence about how to achieve better quality.

In 1993 Lee Harvey and Diana Green published their article “Defining quality”, which aimed at addressing the nature of the concept of quality in relation to higher education” (1993, p. 9). The widely differing conceptualizations of quality can be grouped into five discrete but interrelated categories they state. Quality can be viewed as exception, as perfection, as fitness for purpose, as value for money and as transformative. These five categories (which involve most different functions within quality systems) are the most widely used ones in the quality discourse, and according to Elken, much of the literature still centres on these five conceptualisations, taking one or more of them as a starting point. But do they provide us with a unified concept? What, if anything, do the five categories have in common which justifies their being subsumed under the quality umbrella?

No doubt there are many ways of exploring such problems, but in this paper we propose to use definition theory. When we come across large, unwieldy, fuzzy concepts, we ask for a definition; typically a “what is” question. Definitions are supposed to help equivocation, bring clarity and understanding of the meaning of concepts, and hence facilitate public discourse. Already Plato explicitly requested definitions to end the confusion between different senses of words. But what is a definition? What do they give us? What epistemic status should we accord them? Do we need them, or are some concepts useful precisely because of their ambiguity? How can we understand the problem of finding a clear definition of quality in higher education? Is it fruitful – or even possible to strive to achieve more coherent definitions of the purposes and goals of quality definitions? What does it mean to improve quality?

Our point of departure is Israel Scheffler’s (1974) useful distinction between different types of definitions found in every day discourse. Some definitions are stipulations to the effect that a term is understood in a special way throughout a certain discourse. A stipulative definition is a “local” piece of terminological legislation; it does not purport to reflect standard usage. This may in fact be what much literature on quality does, but without being aware of it and quite possibly aspiring to achieve a different kind of understanding, namely a descriptive definition. Such definitions are often answers to requests for clarification, to “what is” questions. “What is” questions abound in the social sciences. Interestingly, Karl Popper (2007) suggests that this question is the wrong question to ask, since it sends us on a futile chase for the nature or essence of things. And indeed, quality seems to defy all attempts at essentialist definitions. Scheffler’s third type of definition is the programmatic. Such definitions convey practical consequences, and social or moral questions are relevant, something they patently are not in the case of stipulative and descriptive definitions. This perspective is of great interest in the quality discussion, as academic studies risk being closed down if their quality is not deemed high enough.

To address the problem of a common core (or lack thereof) of various meanings of a concept, we shall employ Wittgenstein and his idea of family resemblance (1953). It would seem that we tend to think that meanings of a term should have something in common in order to be identified as meanings of the same term, as suggested above. Wittgenstein frees us from this, by insisting that category a might share a trait with category b, and b with c, but not necessarily a with c. The implications of this for our understanding of Harvey and Green’s five categories of quality in higher education will be explored.

Why have we not been able to come up with a fundamental definition of quality yet, given that we all (think we) recognize it when we see it? In this paper we explore perspectives that illuminate alternative paths for understanding the concept of quality. These perspectives have the potential to shed new light on the discourse about quality in higher education.  

References:

Elken, M. 2007: QU Trends 1995-2006 Literature overview. University of Oslo

Harvey, L. & Green. D. 1993: Defining Quality. Assessment and Evaluation in Higher education, 18, 1, 9-34

Popper, K. 2007. The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. 1. London: Routledge

Scheffler, I. 1974: The Language of Education. Springfield, IL: Charles Thomas Publishers

Wittgenstein, L. 1953: Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell